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ISSUE ON APPEAL
judge erred in sentencing Mr. Munoz-Chavez to a Unified Term of four (4) years,
with a determinate sentence of eighteen ( 18) months and an indetem1inate sentence of thirty
months, despite falling within the statutory maximum, as Mr. Munoz-Chavez was
attempting to defend himself from the Victim when he engaged in the Aggravated Battery.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 8th day of October, 2013, Defendant Rogelio Munoz-Chavez
(Defendant) discharged a firearm in the direction of the victim, Encarnacion (Sean) Duarte, in the
attempt to dissuade the Victim from continuing a physical fight with the Defendant. The firearm

•
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Victim, resulting in injury to the Victim. As a result, on or about that same day,
8

Defendant was arrested and charged with one count of Aggravated Battery in violation of I.C. §
'I

Ir)

l)(b).
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the 21 th day of July, 2014, Defendant Rogelio Munoz-Chavez, pursuant to a Plea Agreement
bet ween the parties, entered a plea of Guilty to one count of Aggravated Battery in violation of

§ 18-907(1 )(b). The Defendant attended a Sentencing Hearing on September 29'\ 2014,
;:;:

\Vas sentenced to a unified sentence of four (4) years, with a total of eighteen ( 18)
mornhs determinate and thi1iy (30) months indeterminate, with a total of twenty-four (24) days
being credited for time served.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
:vfr. :v1unoz-Chavez challenges the sentence imposed upon his conviction. In those cases
the Defendant challenges the sentence within the statutory maximum, the court reviews
6

the evidence and determines whether there was clear abuse of discretion by the judge.
sentence will be
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be upheld if it is found to be reasonable; a sentence is reasonable if it

appears necessary, at the time of sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
, and to achieve any or a!l of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution
applicable to a given case.
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S1a1e v. Toohi/1, 650 P.2d 707 (Id. Ct. App. 1982).
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Id. at 710.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The judge abused his discretion in sentencing Mr. Munoz-Chavez to a unified
term of four (4) years, as Mr. Munoz-Chavez was attempting to defend himself
from the Victim when he engaged in the Aggravated Battery ..

The sentence of the Defendant to a Unified Sentence of four years violates the "clear abuse o
discretion" standard established in State v. Toohill, 650 P.2d 707 (Id. Ct. App. 1982), and is
therefore excessive.
IU

Appellate review of the length of a sentence imposed by a lower court is governed by a "clear

!1

abuse of dist:retion'' standard. "Review of the length of a sentence is governed by the same 'cle
abuse· standard discussed above. Our Supreme Court has held that if a sentence is within the

,,
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statutory maximum, it \.vill not be disturbed on appeal unless the appellant affirmatively shows a
· clear abuse of discretion.'" State v. Too hill, 650 P .2d 707, 710 (Id. Ct. App. 1982). A sentence
within the statutory maximum will be upheld if it is found to be reasonable, defined by the court
as "'appear[ing] necessary, at the time of sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of

JQ

protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or
21

retribution applicable to a given case." Id. Sentences longer than necessary to accomplish these

aims of the comt are deemed unreasonable. Id.
The sentence imposed by the District Court in this case is within the statutory maximum, and
2-1

25

is therefore governed by the "clear abuse of discretion" standard. "An aggravated battery is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not to exceed fifteen (15) years." LC.§ 18-908.

29
30

7

Insofar as a Unified Sentence of four (4) years does not exceed the statutory maximum of fifteen
(15) J ears, the Sentence is therefore governed by the "clear abuse of discretion" standard.
Nevenheless, the sentence is unlikely to accomplish the aim of protecting society, deterring
future acts of violence or providing rehabilitation for the Defendant, and is therefore excessive.
The Defendant in this case had already been involved in a fistfight with the Victim, and feared
both that the Victim intended to re-initiate the fight, and that he would bring reinforcements into
the altercation \:vith him. The Defendant attempted to deter the Victim fi:om re-initiating the
9

physical conflict, and in so doing, shot him instead.
ll

Under such facts, it is difficult to see how the Sentence imposed by the Court upon the
Defendant meets the standard established in Toohill. The Defendant himselfis not a threat to

]3

society. having never before engaged in any violent conduct against any person. Indeed, the
Defendant only engaged in such actions in extremis when faced with the impending assault by
I~

more than one man, each of whom was larger and younger than he. And even then, the
IX
j-)

Defondant clearly admitted from the beginning that he thought that he was firing to the ground in
front of the Victim, rather than directly at him. While his actions were arguably imprudent, the
imprudence of the Defendant is not a justification for imposing a sentence under Toohill.

21

Under the standard Too hill does establish, the sentence of the Court ignores that the goal
of protecting society ought to have mitigated rather than aggravated the sentence. Defendant had
24

reason to fear for his safety because he had been in a physical altercation with the Victim only a
half-hour prior, and that the Defendant had reason to believe that the Victim intended to escalate
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the threat himself by bringing more assailants than the Defendant could be expected to defend,
and had no way of knowing whether the Victim would arm himself \Vith weapons sufficient to
finish the attack. The law does not countenance that the battered must allow himself to be
attacked a second time \Vith even greater force to attempt self-defense. In short, while the
imposition of this sentence clearly relates to the primary goal of protecting society, it
ne\ertheless ignores both the principle of self-defense in protecting society, and the fact that the
De fondant had an interest in protecting himself under the facts of the case.
Moreover, the Sentence in this case possesses, at best, minimal deterrent effect, and to the
extent that it does, it presents a potentially chilling effect against valid attempts to defend oneself
While the actions of the Defendant to\vards the victim may have been imprudent, they were
ne\ ertheless understandable given the circumstances of the case. The Victim had assaulted the
1'

Defendant a half-hour prior to the shooting. The Victim was a larger, stronger man than the

it>

Defendant. The Victim had family on the fam1, and a half-hour to potentially arm himself. And
IX
i9

the Victim returned, in Defendant's eyes, to continue the conflict, thereby demonstrating that
fisticuffs were already insufficient means to deter and prevent future attacks on his person.
In such a circumstance, it is highly unlikely that similarly-situated individuals will consider
the potential legal consequences of their actions above their immediate need to protect their
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person . .tvforeover, given the pre-eminent principle of protecting society, it is critical that the
Court countenance whether they wish individuals to make such calculations in the moment, lest
they risk innocents refraining from their legal right to defend themselves lest they be charged

27

28
29
11)

9

with a crime. As such, the principle of deterrence again ought to mitigate rather than aggravate
, I 1he Sentence imposed in this case.

i

finally, the Sentence provides little to no rehabilitative value for the Defendant. The
.;

Defendant has no history of violence. The Pre-Sentence Report shows that the Defendant's prior
record consists of one Count of Disturbing the Peace fifteen years previously when he was a
minor. :'.\or still does the Defendant show any inclination or pattern of acting in anger or
impetuously. He does have a long history of productive employment, a stable man·iage, and
q
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good relations with the community in which he lives. This act, in short, seems to be a significant
aberration from his usual actions, which is in keeping given the extreme provocation it took to

I'

produce it. It is unclear then exactly how one rehabilitates a person for their inclination to
violence and aggression when that person, barring one extreme act in extreme circumstances,
I'.\

demonstrates no such inclination.
As such, the Court is left only with the final prong of retribution. While it is certainly true

,~

that, as the Pre-Sentence Report mentions multiple times, is a member of a currently disfavored

jtj

class. namely that of an undocumented immigrant, it is nevertheless improper for the Court to
enact retribution on those grounds without first charging him. The only proper grounds for

·1

retribution is the act for which Defendant was charged, and the act for which Defendant was
charged resulted from an attempt to defend himself from a second battery upon his person by the
24

Victim. As such, the only grounds upon which the Court may rest its sentence is that they find
that the Defendant acted imprudently in his attempt to defend himself from that second battery,
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their sentence to express their displeasure at

imprudence.

were the

such an argument acceptable, it is nevertheless clear that a lesser sentence would
the same displeasure, and as such is not necessary. The sentence therefore is
umeasonable under the Too hill standard, and must be set aside as exceeding the discretion of the
()

District Court.
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CONCLUSION
Insofar as the Sentence exceeds that necessary to impose the desired goals of protecting
. deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution, it is unreasonable, and therefore exceeds the
standards of discretion described in State v. Toohill, 650 P.2d 707,710 (Id. Ct. App. 1982). The
sentence therefore exceeds judicial discretion, and ought to be reduced to comport with the

r'

'1/

standard.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on this ' ; day of January, 2015, I served the foregoing
h

Appellant's Brief to the attorney for the Plaintiff-Respondent by depositing a copy thereof in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

j(J

Lawrence G. Wasden
ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. Box 8372
Boise, ID 83 720-00 l 0
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